One of the greatest surprises in the debate over the so-called New World Order in the final decade of the twentieth century was how the concept of empire won an astonishing new respectability. The word ''empire,'' which for decades had possessed a negative connotation (especially in American usage), increasingly took on a positive resonance-and not just among journalists. 3 For theorists and policymakers, the notion of a ''good empire'' once again became thinkable: empire as a multicultural, flexible form of power operating across vast distances that could promote (if not guarantee) human rights, development, order, and prosperity. 4 In order to justify the use of force, however, this concept ''good empire'' required both the development of a suitable new form of warfare and a reformulated narrative legitimation of this warfare. 5 In the post-Cold War geopolitical environment, American debates over foreign interventions no longer pivoted around the old battle lines of internationalism or isolationism but increasingly around the politically sharpened concept of genocide prevention. In the United States, the belief that military operations could prevent or halt genocides led to an astonishing alliance of left-liberal humanitarian interventionism with neoconservative expansionism. 6 On the one hand, neither the Cold War nor the conventional wars of the twentieth century provided usable models for the execution of ''transformative invasions,'' which after 9/11 appeared to have become the norm. 7 On the other hand, references to humanitarian objectives, human rights, American interventionism, and United Nations mandates were not enough to make sense of this new form of transformative invasion. Instead, this new form of warfare, combining humanism and Machtpolitik, had historical roots in a different, rather unexpected place: in the guerilla wars of late European colonialism, which took place from the late 1940s through the early 1960s.
The goal of this essay is to analyze how American and Western European armies have appropriated the operational and conceptual arsenal of European late-colonial warfare and adjusted it to suit their current political objectives. This reception and adaptation of late-colonial approaches to how war is fought, we argue, takes place both in the operational conduct of current Western military interventions and in the portrayal of these wars before a national and international public. Identifying the structural parallels between late-colonial wars and current Western interventions helps to explain why some of today's most important military theorists and planners find themselves attracted to the strategies deployed by European powers during the latecolonial wars.
In the decade since 9/11, the formula of ''learning to eat soup with a knife'' (often attributed to Lawrence of Arabia) has become a watchword for the adaptation of Western armies to the altered demands of what at first was called the ''Global War on Terror'' but which is now more commonly referred to as the ''Long War. ' ' 8 In addition to homegrown American traditions originating with presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the idea of conducting military-led missions against barbarism, injustice, and underdevelopment has roots in European colonialism. 9 Proponents of a systematic appropriation of European late-colonial war experiences criticize the inadequate strategy, tactics, and doctrines of conventional Western armies in combat with guerilla armies in Third World regions. They call for an institutional and political learning process, in which Western democracies integrate their military, development, and propaganda machineries into innovative apparatuses capable of bringing a lasting end to insurgencies-less through firepower than through development programs and aid. These approaches to countering guerilla fighters, first developed and tested during late-colonial wars, appear to their contemporary advocates to be the most militarily and politically plausible options currently available to Western states. The advocates of this integrated approach envision a democratic utopia of a war that is not war at all but instead a military-flanked development effort in underdeveloped areas. In sum, although Western states present their current wars in new humanitarian bottles, the dregs from the old wine of the search for colonial order remains.
One might suppose that few elements of the five-hundred-year history of violent European colonial conquest, occupation, expulsion, exploitation, and murder would seem readily available for reappropriation by democratic states in the twenty-first century. 10 Yet if we nonetheless observe astounding resonances between post-1945 decolonization wars and contemporary warfare, this is because both of these forms of war are very different from both pre-1945 interstate continental warfare and from the previously established patterns of colonial wars up to that point. Specifically, the wars currently waged by the Western powers rehabilitate the concept of counterinsurgency that was first developed during the late-colonial wars. The integrated political-military strategy of antiguerilla warfare addressed operational and political problems that also arise in contemporary conflicts between democracies and guerilla armies. In both the late-colonial wars and the contemporary ''Long War,'' international and domestic publics follow the interventionist power's conduct of the war with a critical eye: the former primarily with respect to compliance with putatively ''universal moral standards,'' which the latter supplement with attention to the costs of the operation.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Western colonial powers developed novel strategies for waging war in culturally foreign zones of the post-imperial periphery. Though militarily these strategies built on older approaches associated with earlier colonial wars, what distinguished this new mode of warfare was the functional integration of destruction and development, of military and civil forces for the lasting transformation of societies. New doctrines and strategies were invented for scenarios in which the adversary was not an opposing army but rather segments of the population itself. In these scenarios, the stylized experience of Western technical superiority, according to which small groups of European soldiers could slaughter a tenfold numerical superiority of African or Asian fighters, was useless. These scenarios involved a frontier but almost never a front, demanded a reliable separation of civilians from combatants, and made the ''winning-over'' of segments of the civilian population vital. 11 These were, finally, scenarios in which a critical domestic public, a highly developed international media environment, and the still fresh memory of the horrors of World War II conspired not only to set high moral standards concerning the application of physical force but also to encourage skepticism about the effectiveness of such efforts. Operating in post-heroic societies, Western societies after 1945 demanded that leaders engage in elaborate efforts to ''sell'' and legitimate wars. 12 Within the circle of the colonial powers, it was democratic states that first developed not only capable propaganda apparatuses but also, in the final phase of colonial rule after 1945, strategies both for separating civilians from combatants within the context of warfare and for offering them programs for economic and cultural ''development.'' In all these respects, the experience of late-colonial warfare in the 1950s rehearsed the arguments and legitimation strategies for wars waged by today's democracies.
Rarely has that leading metaphor of postcolonial studies, the colonial archive, been so visible and accessible as in the case presented here, namely, the contemporary rediscovery and adaptation of late-colonial techniques of violence, power, and domination. Contemporary military leaders operating ''amidst the population'' face a remarkably (indeed disturbingly) similar mission to that of the late-colonial warrior: to construct a civil-military war machine using a complex combination of scholarly guidance, development expertise, and both metropolitan and local military forces. The apologists of counterinsurgency depict it as a form of war that minimizes violence generally and casualties specifically, that realizes lasting improvement and ''development'' for the target population, and that therefore is not really ''war'' at all. The combination of violence, scientific consultancy, and comprehensive social engineering-through which the enemy should not be annihilated but persuaded and modernized-seems especially typical of democratic states. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the post-9/11 intervention in Afghanistan and the attack on Iraq in March 2003, these combat strategies and legitimation paradigms have gained sharply in importance. The isolation of ''drivers'' from ''spoilers of change'' has been central to the directives that General David Petraeus issued as Supreme Commander of the Allied Troops in Afghanistan: ''Separate reconcilables from the irreconcilables. Identify and report obstacles to reintegration. . . . Identify and kill, capture, drive out, or turn the irreconcilables.'' 13 Similarly, the French division general and historian Henri Paris has proclaimed that the Taliban ''must of course be pursued and slaughtered, but solely it alone, within the framework of legality and without unnecessary and indiscriminate violence.'' 14 Alas, today's troops face the same difficulties of doctrinal interpretation that the late-colonial forces did half a century ago: how to determine the ''necessary degree of force''-the definition of which appears nowhere in the field manuals. ''The Field Manual tells us what to achieve,'' the contemporary counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen has admitted, ''but not what to do.'' 15 Counterinsurgency doctrines during late-colonial wars were not more precise on this point, but the observation by the public at home has become more severe since. If military necessity still defines the ''necessary'' degree of force, it is the media hothouse of the home front that defines the ''acceptable'' degree of force.
In claiming a continuity between late-colonial wars and the current ''humanitarian'' wars, we should hasten to add that the contemporary belligerent democracies do not think of themselves as colonial powers, nor do they think of their wars as colonial wars. Still, the overall aim of the Western powers is to increase control over economic, strategic, and political spheres and to bring non-Westerners closer to the West. The following observations bear primarily on Afghanistan, but since the 2006 change in strategy (the so-called surge) they pertain in principle to the war in Iraq as well. At the same time, the strategic adaptations discussed here are broadly generalizable. As a type, the ''transformative invasion'' is already international on account of its applications; it is global on account of the historical points of reference and the markedly global focus of its strategies.
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The Struggle for Hearts and Minds: The Late-Colonial Wars of the 1950s and 1960s
In the cataracts of World War I, alongside the Europe-dominated world order, the Ottoman, Russian, Habsburg, and German empires were washed away. At the edges of these shatter zones arose zones of violence that were not to be ''pacified,'' often for decades. 17 While the British, French, and Dutch colonial empires remained intact (and indeed expanded) after 1918, independence movements became much more dynamic. 18 The fragility of imperial control became undeniable during World War II-the loss of Singapore in February 1942 is emblematic-and then glaring after the end of the war, when the evolution of the European blueprint for peace in the Western hemisphere stood harshly at odds with violence-filled uprisings in colonial territories. While some in the European colonial establishment sought to retain or restore their privileges after 1945, the ultimately unsuccessful French and Dutch attempts to reassert their imperial authority in Indochina and Indonesia demonstrated that the traditional mode of imperial rule was no longer viable. 19 The constantly growing, internationally connected, and media-conveyed pressure of Asian and African independence movements, on the one hand, and the unambiguous anticolonial rhetoric of both the American and the Soviet superpowers, on the other, made new concepts for safeguarding or reshaping colonial rule unavoidable. 20 As the idea of retaining indirect influence in formally independent states replaced the hopes for continued direct rule, imperial counterinsurgency had to be radically reconceptualized. 21 Instead of aiming to quash all independence efforts, the goal became to ensure an ''orderly transition.'' Such late-colonial counterstrategies directed military force against independence movements with a ''revolutionary'' agenda, while at the same time engaging in political and civil reforms whereby potential postcolonial elites capable of ensuring ''continuity'' were to be recruited and supported. A societywide politics of modernization and development, intended to supersede and replace colonial rule through the triad of democracy, prosperity, and modernity, formed the correlate to military force, which would orient itself with all the greater vehemence-at least theoretically-against insurgents. This ''political'' approach to antiguerilla warfare was discussed under the umbrella term ''population-centric counterinsurgency,'' or COIN. 22 Counterinsurgency as a strategic military concept has historically developed from positions of political weakness. The works of classical counterinsurgency theory, which is to say, the canon of doctrines on antiguerilla combat formulated between 1950 and 1970, arose in the face of an invigorated postwar manifestation of anticolonial insurrection, the Mao-inspired ''people's war,'' in which modern techniques of mass organization and mobilization seemed to mix with the energy of an antimodern fervor. 23 Just as the concept ''insurgency'' describes a phenomenon that unites elements of ''rebellion'' with guerilla war yet at the same time goes beyond the sum of these parts, so is counterinsurgency far more than the sum of its military problemsolving approaches. 24 A striking counterrevolutionary euphoria distinguishes the doctrines and strategies of counterinsurgency formulated in the decolonization phase from older concepts of imperial policing and pacification. 25 Perhaps best characterized by the term ''transformative invasion,'' the specific type of warfare developed during the late-colonial period applied a substantial portion of its machinery not to destruction but rather to development. Both in the perception of their strategists and in the eyes of the public, such wars were (and still are) waged in order to contain violence, to create democratic and Western-shaped societies, and to guarantee stability. The concept of the restriction of force and the tight imbrication of pacification, stabilization, and development conferred upon this form of warfare a relatively high degree of acceptance, even before the critical tribunals of democratic societies. Wars of decolonization served as hothouses for the invention of euphemisms appropriate for wars of long-lasting occupation and transformation. Political-juridical concepts like ''state of exception,'' ''mission,'' and ''intervention'' permitted a high level of military engagement, while avoiding the need for parliamentary debate or public approval, in a way that would have been much more difficult in a formally declared war. 26 The Algerian War, during which the French military deployed a conscript force of half a million soldiers, was described within official French parlance not as a war but as ''measures toward the maintenance of order''-a designation that was only changed in 1999. 27 The British war in Malaya yielded comparable concepts. The designation ''emergency,'' for example, was chosen not least because insurance companies would not have compensated for damages incurred there in the event of a declared war. The British also developed a nomenclature for their enemies that has since found adoption many times over: after it became clear to the British that the originally selected term ''bandit'' could be associated with romantic notions of social rebellion, they established the use of the label ''terrorist'' for the communist guerilla. 28 The corollary to this was the discursive construction of a ''civilian population'' whose protection would justify measures such as forced resettlement.
The Malayan Emergency of 1948-60 was and continues to be recognized as a textbook example of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. 29 Although martial law persisted on the Southeast Asian peninsula for twelve years, and though its leader, Ching Peng, did not surrender until 1989, the (rather weak) communist guerilla forces were militarily marginalized already from 1952 onward. 30 In 1960, with the establishment of the Malayan Federation, the creation of a multiethnic and democratic postcolonial state appeared as an exemplary instance of decolonization; from then on Malaya was considered ''the domino that stood still.'' 31 The military approach of the British, or rather the combination of military with political means through counterinsurgency, centered on ''winning the hearts and minds of the population''-a phrase credited to General Gerald Templer, the commander of the Malayan campaign. 32 Central to the campaign's success, according to all subsequent theorists of counterinsurgency operations, was the forced resettlement in camps of large portions of the Chinese minority population, which was how the British attempted to solve the core problem of all guerilla wars, namely, how to differentiate insurgents from civilians.
Although one might have expected that postwar Europeans would have been leery of the concept of forced, concentrated resettlements, a functional and semantic shift on the part of colonial officials enabled its ready acceptance: the negatively connoted concept of ''the camp'' was simply avoided, and instead one spoke of ''new villages.'' Although the Nuremberg Trials and the codification of human rights had promised to establish new universal standards in international politics, European colonial powers created a parallel world, specifically in the form of colonial camp systems and systematic expulsions in which none of the new standards held legal force. 33 Functionally, too, these strategic settlements far exceeded the mere concentration of a hardto-control population. Although sentries and barbed-wire fences advertised the core function of these settlements, the ''new villages'' were also conceived as model sites for accelerated modernization. 34 Resettled civilians were supposed to discover a standard of living that would exceed that of their former settlements many times over. Schools, infirmaries, playing fields, cafes, and sanitary infrastructure would win over the inhabitants of the resettlement villages to the side of the government. In many late-colonial settings, urbanization and resettlement measures were additionally combined with attempts to deploy architecture as well as city and land planning toward the directed ''modernization'' of the society in question. 35 The new villages of late-colonial warfare in the 1950s arguably constitute the most striking site for studying the transition from the concept of ''civilizing mission'' to the concept of a ''modernizing mission.'' 36 In terms of both content and structure, attempts at forced modernization echoed the nineteenth-century rhetoric of ''civilizing missions.'' What made the post-1945 military-enforced efforts at modernization a discrete new model rather than merely a remake of older ones was the integrated civilmilitary apparatus, the democratic ambitions, and the performative imperative before a critical domestic and international public-with Auschwitz as the negative, and the UN as the positive, reference. Committed to the universalist spirit of the Cold War, the new theories of development and modernization paradoxically seemed most thoroughly realizable precisely where they were flanked and facilitated by military force. 37 The late-colonial wars were thus laboratories for testing the theoretical model of forced modernization. 38 Outside of the resettlement camps, too, the European colonial powers deployed a considerable arsenal of development programs in their struggle for hearts and minds. Particular attention was paid to women and children. Educational campaigns in colonial contexts were never ends in themselves. In the late-colonial phase, state-run schools and educational programs augmented missionary-run schools. 39 Along with the teaching of basic knowledge and skills such as writing and arithmetic, these schools took special care to impart ''modern'' values and attitudes: inculcating individualism, openness to technical innovations, and skepticism toward ''traditional'' social structures and ways of life. During the Algerian War, for instance, the French authorities promoted literacy among girls as a way to realign the cellule familiale musulmane, which in turn was regarded as the key to the ''modernization'' of the entire Algerian society. 40 Military-civil directives unapologetically expressed the demographic and biopolitical goals of colonial emancipation politics: ''Educational policy must be directed toward girls as much as toward boys. Women's development is crucial. It is a condition for all true emancipation. It will contribute to reining in the galloping demographic growth of this land.'' 41 The late-colonial state assumed an especially benevolent demeanor not only toward young girls but also toward adult women.
Yet in the late-colonial wars, in which many of the independence movements counted a considerable number of women among their ranks, questions of emancipation and the position of women became a central arena for disputes. 42 Colonial regulation of family, honor, and legal codes was in many places perceived as the clearest manifestation of foreign domination. 43 For the organs of the colonial state, on the other hand, targeted attention to women did not simply promise to heighten the effect of political and social reforms; on the propagandistic home front, protecting colonial women from their own society served as an illustration of the humanitarian aims of colonial war. Staged deveiling campaigns in Algerian cities offer but one example of how the army of a Western democracy could cater to an emancipationist politics. 44 In the contested interiors of comparable decolonization wars, too, women became in a new way victims of direct, often sexual, violence, but also the targets of a whole array of state campaigns for reeducation and development, from courses sewing and childrearing or nutritional counseling to fashion shows. The Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS) moved from mountain village to mountain village distributing thousands of sewing machines (and other household appliances) in the name of the ''modernization'' of Algerian women. ''Women's clubs'' and ''solidarity committees,'' not infrequently led by the wives of high-ranking colonial officers, were also active in internment and resettlement camps. Organized radio evenings and film screenings were likewise part of the ''humanitarian'' strand within Europe's most brutal latecolonial war. 45 In Kenya, the British authorities developed a parallel set of practices as a response to the disturbingly high proportion of women in the revolutionary movement of the so-called Mau Mau. Under the guise of ''rehabilitation,'' the agents of British colonialism in Kenya (who were often female Christian missionaries) sought to assist the Kenyan women's passage ''into modernity'' by imposing new forms of gender relations that conformed to idealized Western norms of the time: political abstinence and concentration on domestic duties within the nuclear family. 46 The motto that was applied to not only gender and family relations but also the reorganization of the entire society was the same then as it is today: stabilization. 47 Wherever late-colonial officials tried to transform ''traditional'' societies permanently and to set them on a course agreeable to European norms, the female portion of the respective societies constituted the most important lever for doing so, at least in the colonial imagination.
Such granular efforts at late-colonial social engineering were often embedded in socioeconomic master plans for the transformation of entire societies. Although the export boom unleashed by the Korean War made it possible to finance the conversion of landless Chinese and small farmers into a mobile rural reserve of labor power in Malaya, similar plans for Kenya and Algeria failed. 48 Measures for the provision of work, which on the ground were hard to distinguish from forced labor, and the division of landholdings, which privileged European settlers and trusted collaborators of the colonial administration, often remained the sole realized forms of these ambitious plans. Nevertheless, this constitutes a decisive difference from most interstate wars of the twentieth century and also from earlier colonial wars in which comprehensive development programs were neither planned nor attempted. A form of war in which soldiers distribute chocolate to the conquered civilians, in which generals grant credits for single-family houses and promote modern pieces of furniture, might be hard to find outside of the specific historical constellation of the ''transformative invasion.'' Such plans-which envisioned the in vitro production of modern subjects who followed Western patterns of consumption and culture-could never entirely be realized within the constraints of bitterly waged late-colonial wars. All the same, the effects of forced modernization and ''uprooting,'' still so visible today, have been enormous. 49 The late-colonial wars also drastically transformed the self-understanding and selfportrayal of European colonial armies. Few images better illustrate the development work of colonial armies than the figure of military vehicles repurposed to plow fields. 50 The same can be said of soldiers and reserve officers who acted as uniformed teachers or doctors. Yet at the same time it was indispensable for the acceptance of militaryflanked development programs to give them as clearly civilian a character as possible. While members of the uniformed military performed many of these ''developmental'' functions, every effort was made to ensure the co-deployment of civilian personnel such as missionaries, nurses, volunteer development aides, and NGOs.
These new sorts of colonial agents were not only to be found in propaganda brochures; they also influenced the structure of the late-colonial military machinery. They gave birth to units specially trained to take over civil administrative functions and establish close contact with representatives of the local population. Apart from the strategically meaningful attempt to gain reliable information on local conditions, experiments with forms of administration and local community were conducted at a depth and scale that prewar imperial rule had neither aspired to nor required. 51 The furtherance of regional and local self-administration thereby operated both as a legitimation strategy and as a hegemonic technique, for the newly established rapprochements were meant to bring long-term ties into being that would render military force obsolete. Maurice Challe, commander-in-chief of the French troops during the Algerian War, neatly encapsulated this altered set of priorities in a 1973 interview: ''One was fighting at the time not for control of a few hectares of land or for the conquest of a province, [but rather to] win over the population, and both parties offered a political future for this. . . . This political outlook inhered in legal equality, the advancement of Muslims to the French level-things which have not been achieved in the 130 years of occupation.'' 52 Just as the colonial armies themselves had to adapt their form to the changed requirements of the task, so too did the wars of late colonialism lead to the rise of an officer type that differed fundamentally from the military elite deployed during the two world wars.
In terms of military experience, the generation of officers whose defining coordinates bore the names Blitzkrieg, Stalingrad, El-Alamein, Midway, Dresden, and Hiroshima had little to offer the asymmetric wars of late colonialism. For the waging of such wars, this generation could draw only partially on older experiences from the history of colonialism; most often, it had to improvise new concepts. 53 To develop a successful counterinsurgency concept, these officers emphasized the army's aptitude for learning and adaption, as well as the fusion of civilian with military commands. The ''tiger of Malaya,'' General Templer, became the paragon of the prudent latecolonial military commander, a man who recognized the political and military challenges at the right time and in the right place and then took the right steps to meet them. 54 At a deeper level of hierarchy, the colonial powers produced an officer type characterized by a complete adjustment to local conditions and the requirements of counterinsurgency. Over the course of three decades, such specialists often ended up as counterinsurgency practitioners and advisors not just once but repeatedly on various continents in various colonies, applying the ''lessons'' from previous campaigns to later ones. The British officer Sir Robert Thompson, for instance, acquired experience in Palestine, Cyprus, and Malaya, which he then passed on as a military advisor in Kenya and later South Vietnam. 55 This counterinsurgency expertise also passed between armies: French officers like Roger Trinquier and David Galula, who emerged as strategic masterminds of the new warfare in Indochina and Algeria, went on to serve as consultants for the United States as well as various Latin American armies and became widely read authorities in the counterinsurgency literature. 56 Among the most remarkable innovations of late-colonial warfare and counterinsurgency was the high degree to which this body of doctrine drew on the expertise of the social sciences. Even though colonialism was more important to the development of ethnography than the other way around, and even though the significance of the scholarly contribution to colonial practice should not be overestimated, the efforts on the part of late-colonial officials to renew the interconnection is noteworthy. Plans for transforming the colonies used the academic ethnography and social sciences of their day to create reading aids, instructions for soldiers and colonial administrators, and legitimation campaigns (both in the colonies and on the home front).
The anticolonial insurgency in 1950s Kenya engendered perhaps the most bizarre forms of militarized social science, whereby sociological pseudo-experts came to exercise great influence over the courses of action taken by the government. Social scientists helped to interpret and to make sense of the insurgency; they advised colonial authorities to tell friend from foe and to pragmatically define reconcilables and irreconcilables. As white settlers and political elites in London struggled to understand the insurgency in terms of older models of anticolonial rioting (labeling it a ''yell from the swamp''), the ''scientific'' advice of scholars and putative experts gained a considerable hearing. 57 Both military ethnographers and renowned experts in the culture of the Kikuyu not only psychopathologized the uprising as a kind of tribal mass psychosis but also actively participated in drafting counterstrategies against the same, occasionally even implementing these in personal cooperation with the army. Thus ''Her Majesty's witch doctors'' acted in Kenya as exorcists and masters of ceremony in staged mass conversions held at captive reeducation camps. 58 The selfstyled ethno-psychiatrist John Carothers claimed to elucidate ''the soul'' of the Mau Mau Uprising and purported to lend a helping hand for the lasting alteration of Kenyan society. 59 Echoing the assumptions of contemporary American modernization theory, Carothers diagnosed the insurgents as suffering from difficulties in the transition form ''traditional'' to ''modern'' life.
Arguably even more influential was Louis Leakey, who grew up bilingual in Kenya as the child of English missionaries, became an initiated member of the Kikuyu and then later studied at Cambridge before embarking upon an idiosyncratic yet meteoric career as a paleoanthropologist and ethnographer. During the Mau Mau Uprising, Leakey served as an advisor, translator, and spy for the British government. His duties included attempting to translate Mau Mau ''oathing,'' so central to the identity and solidarity of the rebels, into the language of British Machtpolitik. 60 Carothers and Leakey both helped to invent a counteroath and to outline mechanisms and techniques of reeducation and rehabilitation aimed at crushing the rebellion of the former subjects of their studies. In sum, the belief that social scientists might help colonial officials understand the breaking points within traditional societies, as well as reveal levers for reconstructing these societies as modern ones, was popular especially among the liberal parts of the colonial and political elites in 1950s efforts at forced modernization.
In Malaya and Algeria, too, scholarly findings about the ''Chinese mind'' or the ''slavish character of the Muslim'' played a considerable role in the formulation of political and military strategies. 61 During the Algerian War, Jacques Soustelle, a renowned anthropologist, served for a time as governor, employing Germaine Tillion, a heroine of the French Resistance, an ethnographer, and expert in North African Berber culture, as his advisor for the ''modernization'' of the country. 62 Both the conduct of war and the organization of the colonial armies itself experienced a strong tendency toward scientization. With statistical inquiries into development efforts, mathematical calculation of enemy troop numbers, and multicolor diagrams, the leaderships of colonial armies tried-above all when compelled to justify their exploding budgets-to persuasively ''prove'' their progress, which naturally would become apparent only over longer time spans. The militarily and socially engineered attempt to reduce the ''enemy masses'' to a manageable size yielded various systems of categorization. In Kenya, for example, the British divided Kikuyu camp detainees into three categories: white for those capable of resettlement; gray for those susceptible of reeducation; black for those to be detained indefinitely. The liberal segment of the British colonial administration, at least, had interpreted the Kikuyu uprising as a crisis of modernization and consequently had wanted to construe the camps as part of a program of controlled and accelerated modernization. 63 
Rediscovery and Adaptation in the Twenty-First Century
At the start of the twenty-first century, Western states have entered into modes of military engagement that show astonishing similarities to the wars of late colonialism, despite the fact that none of today's Western states aspires to defend or return to colonial rule. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Western militaries had immense kinetic capabilities at their disposal, but virtually no doctrine or capability for administering civilians. In terms of the intellectual and professional pedigree of officer elites, the imprint of the Cold War and the Fulda Gap, or of ICBMs and nuclear arsenals, had become irrelevant to the problems posed by the Long War. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Western powers showed themselves immensely capable of blowing the doors off of opposing regimes with ''shock and awe,'' but signally incapable of forging the targeted societies anew. In Iraq and Afghanistan, a purely military strategy reliant on firepower and cutting-edge technology was followed by a neoconservative master plan for the democratization of a ''Greater Middle East'' that would repeat the success stories of Germany and Japan after 1945-only to result in horrifying and bewildering insurgencies. 64 In the face of these failures, the search for more practicable concepts intensified, leading to a remarkable rediscovery of the late-colonial wars. Largely out of sight of both social scientists and the wider public, these historical experiences have become over the last decade the object of intense discussion in military circles as potential sources of ideas and techniques relevant to the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other battle spaces of the Long War. Military interest in the history of ''small wars,'' as the British officer Charles Callwell termed them in 1896, has multiplied. 65 Influential groups of young, conspicuously intellectual officers in the United States and various Western European democracies have tried to distill viable military doctrine from the scattered experiences of the late-colonial wars. Under the rubric of ''expanding the learning curve,'' the French and British armies have treated the history of the late-colonial wars as a mine from which to quarry raw materials for strategies and techniques relevant in the present. 66 In particular, the French army has synthesized its own colonial experiences in elaborately documented treatises, comparing them to contemporary British experiences and interpreting them as suitable models for today's Long War. In this way the late-colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria have been quietly reframed not as national tragedies to avoid repeating at all costs, but rather as helpful pilot studies in the Long War. 67 This reframing of the colonial archive as a useful technical resource has been a transnational process, culminating in one concept: ''population-centric counterinsurgency.''
Fashioning the Scholar-Warrior
The concept of counterinsurgency, previously connected both to the American debacle in Vietnam and dirty, inconclusive proxy wars in Latin America, has experienced a staggering revival, helped along by rebranding under the acronym COIN. 68 As conventional military superiority has been neutralized by national and international outrage at high civilian casualties-it is simply not politically acceptable to kill tens of thousands of civilians, as it was during World War II, for example-counterinsurgency experts capable of ''thinking holistically'' (or capable of representing themselves as such) have become ever more sought after by Western militaries. The result has been the growing visibility of a peculiar new sort of public military officer: one who combines command experience and a mastery of strategic thinking with degrees from elite universities, publications at Oxford University Press, a cultivated demeanor, careful diction and civil habitus and, above all, media savvy. Self-consciously distancing themselves from the image of the bull-necked strategist of tanks and firepower, who regards the drilling of wells and the handing out of candy as a waste of time and resources, these scholar-warriors combine deep knowledge of the theater of military operations with a sensitivity toward the prevailing mentality and culture (the so-called human terrain) in order to meet the basic prerequisite for the success of a counterinsurgency operation: the reliable separation of friend from foe, the groups to be protected from groups to be combated. 69 Finally, many of these counterinsurgency practitioner-intellectuals have shown impressive telegenic communication capabilities in which the word ''progress'' does not refer to advancing tank armies but to gigantic projects whose aim is to convert entire civilizations from violence-breeding ignorance and backwardness to a more modern, educated, civilized, and peaceful social order.
The best and brightest exemplar of this new officer type is undoubtedly the American general David Petraeus, the newly appointed director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Typifying the close relationship between military prowess, military-historical knowledge, and intellectual foresight, the West Point graduate obtained his Ph.D. in history from Princeton University in 1987 and went on to teach at West Point. His doctoral thesis, titled ''The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam,'' addressed a central operational question of modern counterinsurgency: how can military institutions learn from their mistakes in order to achieve greater flexibility and enhance their effectiveness? With these intellectual credentials in place, Petraeus went on to command the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, leading the capture of the city of Mosul. In occupied Iraq, he assumed responsibility for the build-up of Iraqi security forces and played a decisive role in the development of reconstruction projects across the country, earning himself a legendary reputation as a counterinsurgency practitioner. This status spread to a broad international public when in 2007 he became the front man of the so-called surge, the intensification of the counterinsurgency efforts with considerably more troops and equipment. Petraeus codified his insights in the Army's official Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, whose writing he oversaw. In his next position, as supreme commander in Afghanistan, he reworked the strategy of the International Security Assistance Force to combine military and civil counterinsurgency efforts, in the process becoming the prime military and intellectual guru of modern counterinsurgency. 70 Even if the appeasing effects of the surge seem to remain shaky, fragile, and uncertain-to say the least-an influential interpretation of the Iraq counterinsurgency and its result presents the surge as the practical test of strategies and tactics Western armies now have at their disposal in the battle space of the Long War. 71 In the middle of what had begun to seem like quintessentially ''dirty wars,'' David Petraeus's model of counterinsurgency promised military superiority with a human face.
In the process of rising to the very apex of the U.S. and NATO military establishment as the most prominent advocate of counterinsurgency, Petraeus also brought with him a group of young officers who styled themselves as a progressive subculture within the military. 72 Embodying an updated version of action civilo-militaire-the tight interlocking of military and civilian strategies that the strategists of late-colonial warfare propagated-these officers derived the centerpieces of their theory of counterinsurgency from a deep academic study of the history of late colonialism. Today, as president of the Center for a New American Security, a think tank, Nagl remains influential in Washington and continues to contribute to the ongoing discussions about the military strategies of the United States and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The revivification of the concept and practice of counterinsurgency may have started in the United States, but its historical roots are international, and the process of adaptation has been global. Most of the recently rediscovered doyens of counterinsurgency served in European armies but already wrote for an international audience at that point. The aforementioned French officer David Galula (1919-68) was one of the most prominent precursors of this type. A career officer and graduate of the elite French military academy Saint-Cyr, he witnessed wars and insurgencies in Africa, Calcutta, China, Indochina, Greece, and Algeria, both as a practitioner and theoretician. After retiring from the army in 1962, he worked for the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, and held a position as associate professor at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. His 1963 work Counterinsurgency Warfare had an enormous impact on the American military, even more than on the French military, which by then was ending its late-colonial wars. After a thirty-five-year delay, his book was published in French in 2008, now with a foreword from Petraeus, who proclaimed his French predecessor the ''Clausewitz of counterinsurgency.'' 74 Galula's ideas and the late-colonial école française of counterinsurgency enjoy a formidable presence in the thinking of Petraeus, and their intellectual fingerprints are all over the current counterinsurgency handbook of the U.S. Army. 75 In the current period, arguably the most active prophet of the counterinsurgency revival has been the Australian David Kilcullen, who characteristically has combined battlefield experience with academic qualifications. Following his dissertation (in political anthropology) on the suppression of guerillas in Indonesia since 1945, he has entered into various strategic debates in consistently influential ways, and along with Nagl he belongs to General Petraeus's kitchen cabinet. 76 Kilcullen's most notable proposal has been his suggestion that the ''war on terror'' should be understood as a global counterinsurgency campaign. 77 His endeavor, in his own words, is to conceptualize a new version of counterinsurgency tailored to the specific conditions of the twenty-first century. 78 The longer the Long War takes, the more the ''militaryintellectual complex,'' originally developed during the late-colonial wars and the Cold War, returns with the counterinsurgency apologists of the present. 79 
Understanding Native Culture
Complementing the intellectualization of the officer caste has been an astounding growth in the importance of the concept of culture within military thought, an effort that has entailed much more than mere lip service. 80 As during the late-colonial wars, contemporary civil-military apparatuses have experimented with techniques for extracting the most precise knowledge possible of the ''hearts'' meant to be won. During the late-colonial period and again today, the establishment of ethnographic contact with the population has lain at the center of these efforts. Just as the image of an officer, sans helmet, sitting on the ground with loosened clothing while chatting with the Muslim population frequently was a staple of the propaganda brochures of the French army in Algeria around 1958, today the cover of the current British counterinsurgency field handbook shows a photo of a young officer, dressed military-casual, as he sits with five Afghanis on the ground and appears to lecture. 81 Nor is this simply a branding exercise: General Petraeus directs his men to take off their Oakley sunglasses and wherever possible seek out conversation and achieve cooperation with the population. If a planned three-day ''warrior leader course'' reveals the limits of the military's cultural discoveries, the vast expenditures levied to teach officers ''strategic foreign languages'' bear witness to the great earnestness of such efforts.
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By recruiting and deploying ethnographers, Western military apparatuses have been striving in an unusually intense way to integrate anthropological knowledge of the culture of the target populations-including knowledge generated during the colonial period. 83 The so-called human terrain system, for instance, under which rubric British and American armies began in late 2005 to field ethnographically trained small units at brigade level in order to be able to distinguish between friend and foe and establish trust-building measures, is structurally very close to older traditions of the application of ethnographic knowledge for the organization of imperial rule. 84 Socalled foreign terrain officers strive to generate interpretations ''in the field'' that are both more socio-anthropologically accurate and militarily useful. 85 (And allegedly with positive humanitarian results: the proponents of HTS claim it has reduced the rate of fatalities caused by allied troops by 60 to 70 percent.) 86 Less operational and more strategic is the advice that ethnographers and other social scientists have offered to explain (and thus more successfully combat) Islamic martyrdom and the motivational structures of suicide bombers. 87 In sum, a utilitarian, power-oriented attitude toward ethnographic knowledge has effectively trumped the once scrupulously circumspect anthropological approach to war and conflict. 88 There has been great criticism of these efforts as leading to an ''armed social science'' that threatens to degenerate into a spy unit. 89 Concern about the social sciences feeding a running war machine has reprised Vietnam-era debates and concerns about the particular contributions of anthropology as the ''handmaiden of Imperialism.'' 90 The cleavage within the social scientific community has a scientific and a political side. In November 2007 the executive board of the American Anthropological Association distanced itself from academic contributions to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, speaking of a ''problematic application of anthropological expertise, most specifically on ethical grounds.'' 91 The work of colleagues on the ground, the board argued, was unprofessional, violated the professional codes of the discipline, and in many cases exacerbated military conflict. 92 Answers to these charges have been jointly penned by anthropologists and military officers: anthropological input, they claim, has enabled the effective exertion of influence upon the military apparatus, reducing violence, saving lives, and eliminating the need for 70 percent of ''kinetic'' operations. 93 In telling ways, this contemporary debate resembles colonialera debates on how to make anthropology operational and ''useful.'' During the 1930s the leading minds of a ''practical anthropology'' had successfully praised and promoted the value of anthropological knowledge for the better organization of colonial rule. For example, Bronislaw Malinowski hoped to provide colonial officials with a subtler and gentler understanding of the civilizations they intended to rule. 94 Today's anthropology, as a discipline and a profession, undoubtedly exercises a much higher degree of critique and skepticism about military and administrative intervention than did colonial-era anthropology. However, two aspects remain unchanged: first, the desire on the part of some anthropologists to leave the realm of lofty theories, ''to be practical,'' to reduce violence, and to help people in their ''transition'' to socalled modern lifeways; and second, despite rising criticism, military and civil authorities seem to have few difficulties finding sufficient quantities of highly motivated academic advisors with anthropological competence.
Even as parts of the military have officially embraced ethnographic knowledge and cultural sensitivity as a cornerstone of effective counterinsurgency, the tension on the ground between the trigger-pulling ''carnivores'' and the development-focused ''herbivores'' continues to fester. A certain disdain by the ''practical'' man for the intellectual milieu seems to be timeless. The sneer of the later governor of Kenya, Philip E. Mitchell-that anthropologists are interested in how humans on distant southern isles eat their grandmothers, while the practical man is concerned for the protection of his grandmother-continues to capture the frictions between political and military practitioners, on the one hand, and aid workers and social scientists, those ''reluctant imperialists,'' on the other. 95 German officers in Afghanistan today still make fun of naive and badly dressed NGO members, just as officers of the regular French army ridiculed the colonial-era SAS officers in Algeria as ''sweets-soldiers.'' Relations between regular army units, population-centered counterinsurgency units, and the realm of development helpers remain tense, but to a lesser degree than during the latecolonial wars. Military advisors have already noted the parallels to colonial-era consul-tative efforts, independent of the actual results of such cooperation. 96 Despite contemporary anthropology's critique of collaboration with the military, the opportunity to leave the airy spheres of academic debate and engage in the rapid transformation of civilizations remains a tempting offer-one that many anthropologists find difficult to turn down. The result is that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the integration of anthropological knowledge into the battle space, against misunderstood enemies, has reached historically unprecedented levels.
Protecting the Women
One rhetorical figure borrowed directly from the wars of decolonization has been the pretension to improve, through military force, the lot of women in the affected societies. From the Christianization campaigns of the Conquista to medical-scientific attempts at improvement, from the children abducted and consigned to European supervision to the antislavery campaigns around 1900, all the way to the colonial modernization missions of the 1950s, the claim that Western efforts in the South will shield local women and children from barbarism has been an eternally recurring refrain. 97 What was new in the late-colonial wars and what returns today is the notion that these efforts are also central to the effort to ''transform'' a society and thus quash the political roots of actual or incipient insurgencies. Contemporary long-term women's education programs in places like Afghanistan descend directly from the arsenals of late-colonial Machtpolitik and 1950s modernization theory. Both then and now the guiding idea has been that the bullets of military force will pave the road, at the end of which will stand girls capable of reading and writing, as well as women who will no longer be mutilated by their husbands.
In an eerie way, reportage and media discussion of the goals of the war in Afghanistan repeat formulas of the struggle for the emancipation of the Muslim woman that were pioneered during the Algerian War. The by now iconographic frontispiece of Time in December 2001, ''Lifting the Veil,'' which showed the face of an unveiled Afghan woman, resembles in every detail that of the New York Times Magazine in July 1958, which under the title ''The Battle of the Veil'' reported on the French deveiling campaigns in Algeria. 98 In July 2010 the cover of Time displayed the professionally illuminated face of a young Afghan woman in fabrics and colors that figure to the Western observer as ''traditional.''The woman's nose is missing, in addition to both of her ears, as the accompanying text reveals. (The young woman had been mutilated by her husband and brother-in-law after she had proved ''disobedient.'') The title underneath: ''What Happens If We Leave Afghanistan?'' 99 The motif of protection forces flown in to safeguard women from the violence of their husbands, uncles, and brothers was as central to early colonial campaigns against genital mutilation as during the wars in Kenya and Algeria. 100 The image of schools for girls, recurrent in the Afghanistan debate, as a direct achievement of Western intervention and one to be defended at any cost has the aspect of a carefully modernized reissue of French propaganda formulas and political concepts from the Algerian War.
Interrogating the Insurgent
The experiences of the decolonization wars also show that both the conduct of wars and the application of norm-breaking methods of force-such as systematic torture-can, under certain conditions, definitely win majority approval in Western democracies. In democracies the barriers against harsh forms of applied force in the context of counterinsurgency are regarded as high, yet by no means are they insuperable. 101 These barriers come to seem surmountable, and a transformative invasion acceptable, if the enemy can be considered a real threat and the war viewed as winnable. 102 Some months before 9/11, the French brigadier general Paul Aussaresses, who had gained experience in Indochina and Algeria in matters of counterinsurgency and ''information gathering,'' caused a furor with a book in which he candidly reported on French torture methods in Algeria. 103 The former paratrooper, who after the end of the Algerian War worked for the U.S. Army as an instructor at Fort Bragg, had time and again emphasized the military value of systematic torture for counterinsurgency. On American television in January 2002, Aussaresses recommended torture as an effective tool against Al-Qaida. 104 Since that time, a number of influential proponents of information gathering through torture have spoken out in the United States, referring to practices during colonial wars whenever historical references were needed. 105 As Alan Dershowitz has put it, a democracy should fight with one hand tied behind its back, but cannot fight with both tied there. In saying this, he refers not only to Abu-Ghraib but also to colonial examples, particularly the Algerian War: instead of having torture practiced in the dark realm of illegality, Dershowitz suggests, it would be better to have clear legal frames for the who, when, how, and to-whatend of torture. 106 Even authors who reject the principle of ''no pain, no gain'' discuss the situational necessity of analogous interrogation methods, and with reference to European experiences in the colonial wars. 107 In the twentieth century, public acceptance of torture appears to have reached its nadir in the years after World War II. 108 Nevertheless, counterinsurgency efforts in various decolonization wars of the 1950s again and again called forth situations that made the cause of information gathering trump humanitarian objections to ''harsh interrogation techniques.'' The struggle of regular armies against insurgents who made use of ambushes, booby traps, snipers, and time bombs repeatedly justified interrogational torture of captives on the grounds that it could allegedly save the lives of threatened civilians. The detention of the designated terror pilot Zacarias Moussaoui in August 2001-and the notion that the timely extraction of his knowledge about the attacks could have prevented 9/11-reinvigorated the torture debate and in so doing spawned countless references to the colonial wars, first and foremost the Algerian War. 109 The constellation to this day discussed as a ''ticking bomb scenario'' by military strategists, philosophers, and social scientists was tellingly first brought into common parlance in 1960 by Jean Lartéguy's French bestseller The Centurions, a novel that connects the Indochina and Algerian wars in narrative fashion. 110 Like Gillo Pontecorvo's film The Battle of Algiers (1962), the late-colonial quasi-fictional archive would also find use as supplied instructional material for American special forces. 111 
Managing the Homefront
A final lesson that current counterinsurgents have learned from the late-colonial wars is how to avoid a collapse of domestic support. Even after fifty years of practical experience, democracies still have difficulties with conducting ''small'' wars, largely because of a vacillating or resistant attitude on the part of voters toward counterinsurgency campaigns. 112 The greater part of the scholarly literature presumes that a central reason for these difficulties stems from the relatively low tolerance of postheroic societies for military casualties. Objections to the ever-mounting casualty toll of Western soldiers played a decisive role in the collapse of support for late-colonial campaigns in both North Africa and Indochina. Central to the effort to avoid similar objections to the current wars has been the refusal of Western militaries to deploy conscript troops and the decision instead to utilize mercenaries on a previously unimaginable scale. American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan have included the largest body of private armed forces in history, during some periods outnumbering regular troops. 113 In March 2011 roughly 174,000 contractors were present in Iraq and Afghanistan. 114 Correspondingly, the number of mercenaries killed at least periodically exceeds that of soldiers in the U.S. Army. 115 Irregular fighters at the side of regular military formations, additionally, mirror the massive use of indigenous or even white supporting formations in the colonial or decolonization wars. 116 In the earlier episodes, the arming and recruitment of as many ''natives'' as possible aimed to break down cultural differences, promote ''modernization,'' and counteract the impression of occupation or foreign rule. 117 Moreover, the building up of autochthonous police and security forces, a task judged central in all counterinsurgency doctrines, makes it possible to present realistic exit strategies to an increasingly critical home front. From Vietnam to Afghanistan, the military has made major media events of elaborately staged handovers of weaponry, spheres of responsibility, and military quadrants. Lewis Sorley and his bestseller on Vietnam, read by Biden and Obama, coined an emblematic formula for the civil-military learning processes from history: A Better War. 118 While some Western military leaders continue to criticize the application of ''soft power'' to create a materially better future for the subject populations of the Long War, in public American and European officers have preferred to present such efforts as the conditio sine qua non of enduring military and political success. 119 These military leaders, and their political masters, continue to depict military ''security'' and development assistance as tightly intermeshed mechanisms, even when they represent stillseparate worlds in practice. In the military apparatus, the adepts of the counterinsurgency doctrine depict civil development workers as an integral part of, not as a competitor or an obstacle to, the military work. For a growing portion of persons in development organizations, military preparation and protection of the terrain is in many cases accepted as a necessary precondition of their work, as is civilian work for military commanders. This mutual comprehension seems much greater than it was fifty years ago. Whatever the lingering resentments between the two spheres, development and military have begun to synchronize and co-adapt their respective forms of action. In comparison to the 1950s, the consciousness of a certain reciprocal dependency seems to have risen strongly. Frequently the military and civil machines for security and change appear bound to each other according to the logic of a catch-22, which also applies to the linkage between military and NGOs in the field. 120 Leading American development economists and officers in military reconstruction teams in Afghanistan perceive ministerial bureaucracy and the ponderousness of ''planners'' as enemies, while the ''searchers,'' flexible decision makers on the ground, are praised as models for the future. 121 This constellation, too, deeply resembles the decolonization wars of the 1950s.
Conclusions
The aim of this essay has not been to discredit humanitarian intervention through the use of anticolonial rhetoric but rather to discuss the astonishing rediscovery of colonial techniques of power, violence, and domination, and to explain with it the ''modernity'' of the late-colonial wars in the decades after 1945. Both scenarios involved the violent assertion of Western interests; both featured the coupling of military force with development programs; both proceeded with sophisticated programs of social engineering and attempts to make the encountered societies ''more Western.'' In both scenarios, postheroic Western democracies took pains to construct narratives that legitimated the use of military force before a critical public. To this can be added internationally coordinated actions in gray areas of international law that cannot be termed ''wars'': the classification of opponents as terrorists, bandits, and backward-looking violent criminals; and immense efforts to win the trust of affected civilian populations. Both the late-colonial wars and today's Long War were characterized by the ardent optimism of true believers, the engagement of thousands in aid organizations, and not least the grand design of modernization theory and modernizing plans. 122 At the same time, comparing contemporary ''transformative invasions'' to latecolonial wars obviously opens the door to political criticism of recent military interventions under the guise of the Long War.
123 First, as we have seen, the argument that humanitarian goals and near-term exit strategies stand for a genuinely new sort of military operation, rather than the enduring neocolonial occupation of a region, was fully developed and tested in the late phase of colonialism. Indirect rule is a genuinely colonial concept in many respects structurally akin to contemporary efforts. 124 Just as with today's Long War, the Western objective in the late-colonial wars was not direct colonial domination but rather lasting, informal, and indirect control and manipulation. Second, arguments that the Long War, waged ''at the periphery,'' is somehow ''irregular'' contain two basic imperial ideas: first, the power to define the geographical and political boundary beyond which the possibility of ''regular'' warfare ends; second, the arbitrary definition of what it is that signifies ''regular'' and therefore legitimate warfare. Every colonial army has utilized precisely this model of argumentation-not only in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. After all, extremely violent operations in poorly understood territories lie at the dark heart of colonial rule itself. Unsurprisingly, so-called unrest and outbreaks of barbarism in these territories in most cases can be attributed at least partially to colonial influence-a fact as true of today's wars as those of the late-colonial period. Ultimately, choosing whether or not to label the Long War's colonially inspired form of warfare ''neocolonial,'' ''neoimperial,'' or ''humanitarian'' is a question of semantic and ideological self-identification.
Beyond such normative questions, it is worth emphasizing that the democratic ideal of ''transformative invasion,'' in which anthropology-savvy soldiers, acting as protectors of the population, differentiate between good and evil, or between ''drivers'' and ''spoilers of change,'' and then apply force in doses as a door-opener for progress and development-a war, in other words, that is at bottom not a war but a form of armed development assistance-appears to belong to the forms of modern utopianism that have appeared repeatedly since the end of World War II, in endless variations on a recursive theme, with the Long War its latest iteration. A more exact and critical examination of the historical experience of transformative invasions need not lead to less political action, but it will almost certainly lead to greater skepticism about the value of the colonial archive for driving contemporary approaches to counterinsurgency.
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